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On the one hand, terrorism is the antithesis of communication. It does not aim at transmitting any 
message to its victims, but at annihilating them. On the other hand, yet, terrorism is extremely pow-
erful communication for those who witness the tragedy, directly or through the media, and are either 
terrified or fascinated by it.1 Terrorist acts revolutionize the social attitudes of individuals and groups, 
pushing them to radically change their lifestyles. Those acts instill fear, but can also attract supporters’ 
admiration. From September 11 on, terrorist jihadist groups have resorted to increasingly sophisticat-
1  Christian Uva, ‘Il terrore corre sul video. Estetica della violenza dalle BR ad Al Qaeda,’ Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2008; 
William Mitchell and John Thomas, ‘Cloning Terror: The War of Images, 9/11 to the Present,’ Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011.
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ed communication in order to 
accompany and influence the 
reception of their violent deeds. 
Obeying to a global tendency, 
for jihadists it was not sufficient 
to perpetrate violence and insti-
gate terror. It was equally funda-
mental to let the world know that 
violence had been committed, 
and what was the appropriate 
cognitive, emotional, and prag-
matic interpretation of it.
However, whereas in the first 
years after the 9/11 attacks ter-
rorist jihadist groups would cre-
ate messages to be transmitted 
by mainstream media (e.g., Osa-
ma Bin Laden’s videos broadcast 
by Al Jazeera), from the sec-
ond half of the 2000s on, these 
groups have increasingly aimed 
at developing their own media. 
The shift has been also a conse-
quence of the world-wide dif-
fusion of social media. Through 
them, indeed, terrorist jihadist 
groups can not only reach large 
audiences, but also learn how 
to become increasingly profi-
cient at it. As several analysts 
have already underlined, there 
is a technical abyss between 
the amateurish videotapes that 
Osama Bin Laden would broad-
cast through Al Jazeera and the 
sophisticated visual editing by 
which the so-called Islamic State 
(IS) flaunts its tragic accomplish-
ments to the world.2 Moreover, 
whereas in the past a tempo-
ral gap would occur between 
perpetration of a terror act and 
communication interpreting it for 
2  Davide Ferrario, ‘Le fiamme della 
guerra si misurano in gradi Fahr-





the global audience, nowadays 
the gap has practically disap-
peared. As some commentators 
have pointed out, whilst in the 
past war acts were accompanied 
by rolling of drums, today ter-
rorist jihadist violence is simul-
taneously ushered by drones of 
Tweets and YouTube videos.3
Timing and technique are not 
the only elements that have 
marked the evolution of terror-
ist jihadist communication in 
the last decade. Also the target 
of such communication has 
changed. Osama Bin Laden’s 
videos were primarily addressed 
to an Arabic-speaking and Mus-
lim audience. Most Westerners 
could access their content only 
through the linguistic and cultur-
al mediation of translators and 
interpreters. Moreover, these vid-
eos predominantly targeted West-
erners as addressees of threats. 
On the contrary, communication 
developed by IS, especially from 
the second half of 2014 on, has 
had a different communicative 
agenda: it addresses Westerners 
not only as targets of terrorist 
threats, but also as potential af-
filiates. That is why IS commu-
nication increasingly resorts to 
European languages, and mainly 
to English and French, but also to 
Russian, German, Spanish, and 
Italian, in order to communi-
cate with its audience. In these 
messages, the visual dimension 
is becoming more and more pre-
ponderant, yet it too seems to 
adopt the codes and styles of 
3  Anti-Defamation League 2012, 
‘Tweeting for Terror: How Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations Exploit 





tion (for instance, Hollywood 
narratives and visual effects).4 
Made by Western affiliates for 
other potential Western affili-
ates, the current IS communi-
cation seems to more and more 
bridge the gap between state war 
propaganda and terrorist commu-
nication; social media have en-
abled terrorists to directly reach 
a global audience as effectively, 
and sometimes even more, than 







mainly to English 
and French, but 
also to Russian, 
German, Spanish, 
and Italian
In particular, the purposes of IS 
communication toward Western 
citizens is manifold:
1. Accompanying, describing, and 
interpreting terrorist acts in 
order to make their own geo-
political narrative globally pre-
dominant against the geopoliti-
cal narrative diffused by western 
governments and mainstream 
media;
4  Francesco Zucconi, ‘Autoritratto 




2. Instilling terror so as to push 
to a destabilizzation of West-
ern lifestyles and consequent 
sociopolitical tension;
3. Gaining ideological and fi-
nancial support among old 
and new sympathizers, as well 
as winning the competition 
for leadership against other 
terrorist groups;
4. Recruiting new members. This 
last goal represents the real nov-
elty of IS terrorist jihadist com-
munication. With more than 
three thousand IS fighters 
holding European passports, 
the phenomenon is difficult 
to underestimate.
From the specific point of view 
of European countries, the shift 
in communication by IS involves 
three major security risks:
1. The risk that especially young 
European citizens are indoc-
trinated by IS propaganda 
and persuaded to join terrorist 
activities in the Middle East, 
mainly in Iraq and Syria. Fight 
casualties in these countries 
already include hundreds of 
young European citizens;
2. The risk that some of these 
European fighters return to 
their countries after being 
indoctrinated and militari-
ly trained, with the agenda 
and the ability to perpetrate 
major terrorist attacks against 
civilians in European cities, 
such as those that recently 
took place in Belgium, France, 
and Denmark;
3. The risk that supporters of IS 
who are European residents, 
even without training outside 
of Europe, are given detailed 
knowledge, mainly through the 
Internet, about how to perpe-
trate major terrorist attacks 





ushered by drones 
of Tweets and 
YouTube videos
Given these risks, a major effort 
of intelligence is required. This 
effort must aim at several goals. 
On the one hand, short-term in-
vestigative goals; it will prove 
increasingly fundamental to:
• Know history, evolution, 
present state, and prospec-
tive lines of development of 
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jihadist terrorist media agen-
cies;
• Analyse media strategies ad-
opted by these agencies;
• Analyse texts produced and 
distributed through these 
agencies;
• Study the circulation of these 
messages through the web;
• Gather evidence and formu-
late hypothesis about the cog-
nitive, emotional, and prag-
matic impact of these media 
campaigns and messages on 
Western audiences;
• Investigate the potential and 
actual Western targets of ji-
hadist terrorist propaganda, in 
order to understand whether 
they share a common social, 
cultural, or psychological 
background.
On the other hand, investiga-
tive goals should be paralleled 
by long-term comprehension 
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goals:5 jihadist terrorist propa-
ganda is not an isolated phenom-
enon in history, but one that can 
be compared and contrasted with 
other instances of violent confes-
sional persuasion that emerged 
in other socio-cultural contexts, 
historical periods, and religious 
domains. 
The evolution of 
media technology 
pushes toward new 
levels of efficacy
Research must therefore put ji-
hadist messages in cross-cultural, 
trans-historical, and interdisciplinary 
perspective, in order to under-
stand the transversal features 
of violent religious propaganda. 
Gaining authority through ref-
5  Scott Atran, ‘God and the Ivory 
Tower,’ Foreign Policy, August, 
2012.
erence to sacred texts and val-
ues;6 labeling the Other as “the 
infidels”; inciting believers to 
forced conversion or to the an-
nihilation of “infidels”; evok-
ing through words, images, and 
other signs the idea of an idol-
atrous enemy to be violently 
subjugated; instilling the desire 
of embarking on dangerous re-
ligious missions and invoking 
the sweetness of martyrdom; 
destroying the cultural and re-
ligious artifacts of the Other: 
all these elements appear recur-
rently in history, often adopting 
expressive and emotional for-
mulae that thin lines of cultural 
genealogy link to past represen-
tations, but that the evolution of 
media technology pushes toward 
new levels of efficacy.7
6  Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, 
‘Reframing Sacred Values,’ 221-46. 
Negotiation Journal, July, 2008.
7  Massimo Leone, ‘Sémiotique du fon-
damentalisme religieux : messages, 
rhétorique, force persuasive’ Paris: 
l’Harmattan, 2014.
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